Although DCD is still in need to be technically refined (as regards to preservation techniques and the period of time which is tolerable for warm ischemia), two reasons contribute to its expansion in several countries: first of all, the decrease in the number of donations after brain death (in Spain, the improvement of road safety is, fortunately enough, a major cause). Secondly, the v In the case of Spain, a review of the literature shows only three reported cases of controlled DCD. The option for uncontrolled DCD in Spain was proposed in 1996 (Matesanz R. "Documento de consenso español sobre extracción de órganos de donantes en asistolia", Nefrología 1996; 16 (Suppl 2): 48-53). A full analysis and assessment of DCD in Spain is given in the National Consensus Document issued by the ONT in 2012: "Donación en Asistolia en España:
Situación Actual y Recomendaciones" (available at http://www.ont.es/infesp/Paginas/DocumentosdeConsenso.aspx). vi Sometimes this "no touch" period has been controversially shorter: Boucek et. Al., "Pediatric Heart Transplantation after Declaration of Cardiocirculatory Death", N. Engl. J. Med, 2008; 359: 359-314. vii See Beatriz Domínguez-Gil et. al., "Current situation of donation after circulatory death in European countries ", Transplant International, 2011; 24: 676-686. fact that the organs obtained from these donors are, in general terms, as good as those procured from brain death or from living donors viii . DCD has gained credentials and acceptance, but still there are many critics and suspicions about its ethical status.
If we consider the circumstances of Mary's collapse, the exhumation of EV in the UK boils down to implementing a policy of "uncontrolled" DCD. It is our contention that there are strong ethical reasons to both promote that option in the UK, and, for very similar reasons, implement Maastricht III in a wider fashion in Spain. To that discussion we now turn.
2.
The ethical justification of DCD 2.1. DCD as a matter of justice and rights: The most straightforward justification for DCD is that, as well as other strategies for increasing the number of donors ix , more lives are saved at no significant cost. From a moral standpoint, donating organs after death pertains, for us, to the genre of "easy rescue" cases.
But in discussing EV what is at stake is not only individual altruism, but distributive justice. We consider that our current institutional and legal frameworks that allow cadaveric organs to perish infringe the basic rights to life and well-being of patients in desperate need. We grant our institutions the power to practice autopsies in corpses even against the deceased's posthumous wishes or the family's desires and we don't see any stringent difference in the case of organ transplantation not to proceed in a similar fashion. DCD is a modest step to reach what seems a desirable outcome: protecting more rights of individuals whose lives and well-being are severely compromised.
However, as opposed to cadaveric organs, it is argued that in DCD cases we are dealing with people not yet dead, whether we consider that some bodily functions are still in place when we remove the organs -which is also the case if we rely on the "whole brain death" criterion-or that the "no touch" period -the 2 to 5 minutes window of time to discard auto-resuscitation-is a "conceptual sleight-of- hand"
x : the patient has died because we have decided not to resuscitate. This is why for many critics DCD is a blatant breach of the so-called "dead donor rule".
DCD and death:
Now, resorting to the situation described in Mary's case, let us suppose that we finally instituted life-sustaining measures such as mechanical ventilation and we gather the consent of the family to remove her organs once cardiac death is pronounced according to the protocol described: have we killed her by removing her organs?
No. We would claim that the death of Mary is caused by a devastating stroke that has left her brain irreversibly damaged and that probably will cause her the intracranial hypertension that will lead to brain death. It cannot sensibly be said that the array of measures displayed during the dying process -including artificial ventilation which, by itself, is not a treatment, or the maneuvers that are started in order to preserve organ perfusion-were the means to kill Mary for the sake of others' well-being or interests.
DCD, end-of-life care and the doctrine of double effect: It is often
contended that EV is not performed in the patient's best interests and that offering ventilation to Mary in order to maximize the chances of obtaining her organs corrupts the purpose of intensive care units. We think neither is the case.
One could claim, along the lines of Govert den Hartogh xi , that if being an organ donor is worthy of praise, far from not being in the patient's interest, EV could be seemed as "death-dignifying", as something which is done in the patient's best interests (Mary's going down in history as a generous contributor to the wellbeing of others). That means that EV is provided for the sake of the patient's posthumous benefits, and the obvious question is if there is such thing as "posthumous interests", be they benefits or harms. We remain unconvinced about the idea of benefitting or harming someone after death. We consider that posthumous interests ought to be respected, but the reason for doing so is indirect (the interests of living people who might be offended or gratified by the way we treat dead people and their memories). case of DCD, as opposed to the standard double effect cases, the foreseen secondary effect -organs' procurement-is clearly beneficial.
DCD and the pre-mortem measures:
A different quarrel has to do with the pre-mortem measures instituted for the sake of optimizing organs' preservation. The array of techniques and drugs and its invasive character varycannulation, administration of heparin sodium, cardiopulmonary by-pass xvi -, but all of them are thought to be illegitimately administered due to the absence of actual consent and the justificatory umbrella of being displayed in the best interests of the patient xvii .
We think, however, that when the family's consent has been obtained both to withdraw the life-sustaining measures and to subsequently remove the organs once death has been pronounced, there is no moral objection against those pre-mortem procedures, which, on the other hand, are harmless. In the case of heparinizationused to prevent clotting-it has been claimed that it has a death hastening effect.
However, the evidence shows that the risk is mostly speculative and may affect only a marginal set of patients eligible to DCD donation xviii . And as we claimed before, once we are dead our organs should be considered as a public-good resource for transplantation purposes xix .
And yet, a genuine conflict might arise when, as in Mary's case, we deal with dying people. Suppose that Mary is an altruist person -she would have donated her organs in "normal" circumstances, after a peaceful death-but has been convinced for years that the "medicalization" of death is an evil, that medical treatments should not be administered when a dignified life is no longer possible.
She has therefore signed a living will in which she refuses any clinical procedure which does not have significant healing purpose. She has only authorized comfort care in the event that her life is coming to an end and she remains incompetent.
xvi A review of the reported techniques can be found in Bastami, supra note 12 at 966. The catalog of those measures in Spain is found at the National Consensus Document, supra note 5 at 83 ff. xvii See Bastami et. al., supra note 12. In Spain those measures have the legal coverage of the presumed consent to donate that was established in the early Transplantation Act of 1979. Our system is formally an opt-out one, although in the practice the consent of the family is routinely requested. , 2007; 16: 396-400, 397-399. xix We should recall that, albeit exceptionally, the imposition of coercive treatments for the benefit of otherscompulsory vaccination for example-might be legitimate in order to prevent great harms. Medicine and Ethics, 2006; 34: 44-48, 48. xxiii Supra note 12 at 721. In the Spanish legal system, as in many others, we have another famous legal fiction of the same sort: the consideration of having been born a fetus for all the consequences -namely inheriting-deemed as beneficial for him (see article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code).
It could be claimed that, in a sense, we are all dying, so there is no real difference between Mary and us. And yet, in common usage we do distinguish between "alive" and "dying". It is proper to ask: "how have you been living lately?"
and not "How have you been dying lately?" Or "How is your life going?" as opposed to "How is your dying process going?"
3.
Concluding remarks: the challenges ahead UK faces the fabulous challenge of surmounting its poor record of organ recovery. EV or DCD, in its two main manifestations, along with many other measures at the clinical and organizational levels, might be implemented for that goal. In the previous pages we have tried to show that the moral objections raised against EV are not decisive.
As to Spain, after being pioneers in enacting a law of presumed consent in 1979 and the normative change that allowed our hospitals to remove organs from donors after cardiac death with full legal backup since 1999, we have not dared to introduce controlled DCD to a significant extent. Regardless of our persistence in leading the rate of organ donation in the world, the time has come to do so because we are still far from meeting the organs' demand.
But in Spain, the UK and elsewhere, there is a more phenomenal challenge.
We have claimed that DCD is justified on distributive justice grounds and that, to the extent that it is linked to the medical care in the final stages of life, it coheres with the interests of the dying patients and their families. However, the current practice is not optimal given the fact that the organ's removal might not be possible if the cessation of the cardio-circulatory function does not come about on time xxiv .
Once the family has assumed the tragedy, the futility of the life-sustaining measures, the unavoidable and imminent death of their loved-one, a final relief comes in the form of a laudable gesture. And yet, it is often the case that things do not turn out as planned; the "death" has not occurred and because of that the organs are ultimately unsuited for transplantation and the dying patient returns to the ICU… to die. Bioethics, 2012; 26: 32-48, 39-40. 
